Abstract. We consider the related notions of two-prover and of relativistic commitment schemes. In recent work, Lunghi et al. proposed a new relativistic commitment scheme with a multi-round sustain phase that keeps the binding property alive as long as the sustain phase is running. They prove security of their scheme against classical attacks; however, the proven bound on the error parameter is very weak: It blows up double exponentially in the number of rounds. In this work, we give a new analysis of the multi-round scheme of Lunghi et al., and we show a linear growth of the error parameter instead (also considering classical attacks only). Our analysis is based on a new composition theorem for two-prover commitment schemes. The proof of our composition theorem is based on a better understanding of the binding property of two-prover commitments that we provide in the form of new definitions and relations among them. These new insights are certainly of independent interest and are likely to be useful in other contexts as well. Finally, our work gives rise to several interesting open problems, for instance extending our results to the quantum setting, where the dishonest provers are allowed to perform measurements on an entangled quantum state in order to try to break the binding property.
Relativistic Commitment Schemes. The idea of relativistic commitment schemes, as introduced by Kent [Ken99] , is to take a 2-prover commitment scheme as above and enforce the no-communication assumption by means of relativistic effects: Place P and Q spatially far apart, and execute the scheme fast enough, so that there is not enough time for them to communicate. The obvious downside of such a relativistic commitment scheme is that the binding property stays alive only for a very short time: The opening has to take place almost immediately after the committing, before the provers have the chance to exchange information. This limitation can be circumvented by considering multi-round schemes, where after the actual commit phase there is a sustain phase, during which the provers and the verifier keep exchanging messages, and as long as this sustain phase is running, the commitment stays binding (and hiding), until the commitment is finally opened. Such schemes were proposed in [Ken99] and [Ken05], but they are rather inefficient, and the security analyses are somewhat informal (e.g., with no formal security definitions) and of asymptotic nature. Schemes that require quantum communication were also considered and studied [Ken12,KTHW13,LKB
+ 13] but those were all without sustain phase. More recently, Lunghi et al. [LKB + 15] proposed a new and simple multi-round relativistic commitment scheme, and provided a rigorous security analysis. Their scheme works as follows. The actual commit protocol is the commit protocol from the Crépeau et al. scheme: V sends a uniformly random string a 0 ∈ {0, 1} n to P , who returns x 0 := y 0 + a 0 · b. Then, to sustain the commitment, before P has the chance to tell a 0 to Q, V sends a new uniformly random string a 1 ∈ {0, 1} n to Q who replies with x 1 := y 1 + a 1 · y 0 , where y 1 ∈ {0, 1} n is another random string shared between P and Q, and the multiplication a 1 · y 0 is in a suitable finite field. Then, to further sustain the commitment, V sends a new uniformly random string a 2 ∈ {0, 1} n to P who replies with x 2 := y 2 + a 2 · y 1 , etc. Finally, after the last sustain round where x m := y m + a m · y m−1 has been sent to V , in order to finally open the commitment, y m is sent to V (by the other prover). See Figure 1 . In order to verify the opening, V computes y m−1 , y m−2 , . . . , y 0 inductively in the obvious way, and checks if x 0 + y 0 = a 0 · b.
What is crucial is that in round i (say for odd i), when preparing x i , the prover Q must not know a i−1 , but he is allowed to know a 1 , . . . , a i−2 . Thus, the execution must be timed in such a way that between subsequent rounds there is not enough time for the provers to communicate, but they may communicate over multiple rounds.
As for the security of this scheme, it is obvious that the hiding property stays satisfied up to the open phase: Every single message V receives is one-time-pad encrypted. As for the binding property, Lunghi et al. prove that the scheme with a m-round sustain phase is ε m -binding against classical attacks, where ε m satisfies ε 0 = 2 −n (this is just the standard Crépeau et al. scheme) and ε m ≤ 2 −n−1 + √ ε m−1 for m ≥ 1. Thus, even when reading this recursive formula liberally by ignoring the 2 −n−1 term, we obtain
i.e., the error parameter blows up double exponentially in m. 1 In other words, in order to have a nontrivial ε m we need that n, the size of the strings that are communicated, is exponential in m. This means that Lunghi et al. can only afford a very small number of rounds. For instance, in their implementation where they can manage n = 512 (beyond that, the local computation takes too long), asking for an error parameter ε m of approximately 2 −32 , they can do m = 4 rounds. 2 This allows them to keep a commitment alive for 2 ms.
Our Results. Our main goal is to improve the bound on the binding parameter of the above multiround scheme. Indeed, our results show that the binding parameter blows up only linearly in m, rather than double exponentially. Explicitly, our results show that (for classical attacks)
Using the same n and error parameter as in the implementation of Lunghi et al., we can now afford approximately m = 2 224 rounds. Scaling up the 2 ms from the Lunghi et al. experiment for 4 rounds gives us a time that is in the order of 10 56 years. We also show tightness of our bound up to a small constant factor (for even n).
We use the following strategy to obtain our improved bound on ε m . We observe that the first sustain round can be understood as committing on the opening information y 0 of the actual commitment, using an extended version of the Crépeau et al. scheme that commits to a string rather than to a bit. Similarly, the second sustain round can be understood as committing on the opening information y 1 of that commitment from the first sustain round, etc. Thus, thinking of the m = 1 version of the scheme, what we have to prove is that if we have two commitment schemes S and S , and we modify the opening phase of S in that we first commit to the opening information (using S ) and then open that commitment, then the resulting commitment scheme is still binding; note that, intuitively, this is what one would indeed expect. Given such a composition theorem, we can then apply it inductively and conclude security (i.e. the binding property) of the Lunghi et al. multi-round scheme.
Our main result is such a general composition theorem, which shows that if S and S are respectively ε-and δ-binding (against classical attacks) then the composed scheme is (ε + δ)-binding (against classical attacks), under some mild assumptions on S and S . Hence, the error parameters simply add up; this is what gives us the linear growth. The proof of our composition theorem crucially relies on new definitions 1 Lunghi et al. also provide a more complicated recursive formula for εm that is slightly better, but the resulting blow-up is still double exponential. of the binding property of 2-prover commitment schemes, which seem to be handier to work with than the p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + ε definition as for instance used by Lunghi et al. Our definitions formalize the following intuitive requirement: After the commit phase, even if the provers are dishonest, there should exist some bitb such that opening the commitment to any other bit fails (with high probability). We show that one of our new definitions is equivalent to the p 0 + p 1 -definition, while the other one is strictly stronger. Our result holds for both definitions, so we not only obtain a better parameter than Lunghi et al. but also with respect to a stronger definition, and thus we improve the result also in that direction.
One subtle issue is that the extended version of the Crépeau et al. scheme to strings, as it is used in the sustain phase, is not a fully secure string commitment scheme. The reason is that for any y that may be announced in the opening phase, there exists a string s such that x + y = a · s; as such, the provers can commit to some fixed string, and then can still decide to either open the commitment to that string (by running the opening phase honestly), or to open it to a random string that is out of their control (by announcing a random y). We deal with this by also introducing a relaxed version (which we call fairlybinding) of the binding property, which captures this limited freedom for the provers, and we show that it is satisfied by the (extended version of the) Crépeau et al. scheme and that our composition theorem holds for this relaxed version; finally, we observe that the composed fairly-binding string commitment scheme is a binding bit commitment scheme when restricting the domain to a bit.
As such, we feel that our techniques and insights not only give rise to an improved analysis of the Lunghi et al. multi-round scheme, but they significantly improve our understanding of the security of 2-prover commitment schemes, and as such are likely to find further applications.
Open Problems. Our work gives rise to a list of interesting and challenging open problems. For instance, our composition theorem only applies to pairs S, S of commitment schemes of a certain restricted form, e.g., only one prover should be involved in the commit phase (as it is the case in the Crépeau et al. scheme). Our proof crucially relies on this, but there seems to be no fundamental reason for such a restriction. Thus, we wonder if it is possible to generalize our composition theorem to a larger class of pairs of schemes, or, ultimately, to all pairs of schemes (that "fit together").
In another direction, some of our observations and results generalize immediately to the quantum setting, where the two dishonest provers are allowed to compute their messages by performing measurements on an entangled quantum state, but in particular our main result, the composition theorem, does not generalize. Also here, there seems to be no fundamental reason, and thus, generalizing our composition theorem to the quantum setting is an interesting open problem. Finally, in order to obtain security of the Lunghi et al. multi-round scheme against quantum attacks, beyond a quantum version of the composition theorem, one also needs to prove security against quantum attacks of the (extended version of the) original Crépeau et al. scheme as a (fairly-binding) string commitment scheme.
Concurrent Work. In independent and concurrent work, Chakraborty, Chailloux and Leverrier [CCL15] showed (almost) the same linear bound for the Lunghi et al. scheme, but with respect to the original -and thus weaker -notion of security. Their approach is more direct and tailored to the specific scheme; our approach is more abstract and provides more insight, and our result applies much more generally.
Preliminaries

Basic Notation
Probability Distributions. For the purpose of this work, a (probability) distribution is a function p : X → [0, 1], x → p(x), where X is a finite non-empty set, with the property that x∈X p(x) = 1. For specific choices x • ∈ X , we tend to write p(x = x • ) instead of p(x • ). For any subset Λ ⊂ X , called an event, the probability p(Λ) is naturally defined as p(Λ) = x∈Λ p(x), and it holds that
for all Λ, Γ ⊂ X , and, more generally, that
for all Λ 1 , . . . , Λ k ⊂ X . For a distribution p : X × Y → R on two (or more) variables, probabilities like p(x = y), p(x = f (y)), p(x = y) etc. are naturally understood as
etc., and the marginals p(x) and p(y) are given by p(x) = y p(x, y) and p(y) = x p(x, y), respectively. Vice versa, given two distributions p(x) and p(y), we say that a distribution p(x, y) on two variables is a consistent joint distribution if the two marginals of p(x, y) coincide with p(x) and p(y), respectively. We will make use of the following property on the existence of a consistent joint distribution that maximizes the probability that x = y; the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1. Let p(x) and p(y) be two distributions on a common set X . Then there exists a consistent joint distribution p(x, y) such that p(
Protocols. In this work, we will consider 3-party (interactive) protocols, where the parties are named P , Q and V (the two "provers" and the "verifier"). Such a protocol prot P QV consists of a triple
Each interactive algorithm takes an input, and for every round ≤ L computes the messages to be sent to the other algorithms/parties in that round as deterministic functions of its input, the messages received in the previous rounds, and the local randomness. In the same way, the algorithms produce their respective outputs after the last round. We write
to denote the execution of the protocol prot P QV on the respective inputs in P , in Q and in V , and that the respective outputs out P , out Q and out V are produced. Clearly, for any protocol prot P QV and any input in P , in Q , in V , the probability distribution p(out P , out Q , out V ) of the output is naturally well defined. If we want to make the local randomness explicit, we write prot P [ξ P ](in P ) etc., and understand that ξ P is correctly sampled -without loss of generality, we may assume it to be a uniformly random bit string of sufficient length. Furthermore, we write prot P [ξ P Q ](in P ) and prot Q [ξ P Q ](in Q ) to express that prot P and prot Q use the same randomness, in which case we speak of joint randomness.
We can compose two interactive algorithms prot P and prot P in the obvious way, by applying prot P to the output of prot P . The resulting interactive algorithm is denoted as prot P • prot P . Composing the respective algorithms of two protocols prot P QV = (prot P , prot Q , prot V ) and prot P QV = (prot P , prot Q , prot V ) results in the composed protocol prot P QV • prot P QV . If prot P is a non-interactive algorithm, then prot P QV • prot P is naturally understood as the protocol prot P QV • prot P = (prot P • prot P , prot Q , prot V ), and similarly prot P QV • prot QV in case prot QV is a protocol among Q and V only.
2-Prover Commitment Schemes
Definition 2.2. A 2-prover (string) commitment scheme S consists of two interactive protocols
between the two provers P and Q and the verifier V , with the following syntactics. The commit protocol com P QV uses joint randomness ξ P Q for P and Q and takes a string s ∈ {0, 1} n as input for P and Q (and independent randomness and no input for V ), and it outputs a commitment com to V and some state information to P and Q:
The opening protocol open P QV uses joint randomness η P Q and outputs a string or a rejection symbol to V , and nothing to P and Q:
with s ∈ {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥}. The set {0, 1} n is called the domain of S; if n = 1 then we refer to S as a bit commitment scheme instead, and we tend to use b rather than s to denote the committed bit.
Remark 2.3. By convention, we assume throughout the paper that the commitment c output by V equals the communication that takes place between V and the provers during the commit phase. This is without loss of generality since, in general, c is computed as a (possibly randomized) function of the communication, which V just as well can apply in the opening phase.
Remark 2.4. Note that we specify that P and Q use fresh joint randomness η P Q in the opening phase, and, if necessary, the randomness ξ P Q from the commit phase can be "handed over" to the opening phase via state P and state Q ; this will be convenient later on. Alternatively, one could declare that P and Q re-use the joint randomness from the commit phase.
Whenever we refer to such a 2-prover commitment scheme, we take it as understood that the scheme is complete and hiding, as defined below, for "small" values of γ and δ. Since our focus will be on the binding property, we typically do not make the parameters η and δ explicit. Definition 2.5. A 2-prover commitment scheme is γ-complete if in an honest execution V 's output s of open P QV equals P and Q's input s to com P QV except with probability η, for any choice of P and Q's input s ∈ {0, 1} n .
The standard definition for the hiding property is as follows:
Definition 2.6. A 2-prover commitment scheme is δ-hiding if for any commit strategy com V and any two strings s 0 and s 1 , the distribution of the commitments c 0 , c 1 , produced as
have statistical distance at most δ. A 0-hiding scheme is also called perfectly hiding.
Defining the binding property is more subtle. First, note that an attack against the binding property consists of an "allowed" commit strategy com P Q = (com P , com Q ) and an "allowed" opening strategy open P Q = (open P , open Q ) for P and Q. Any such attack fixes p(s), the distribution of s ∈ {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥} that is output by V after the opening phase, in the obvious way.
What exactly "allowed" means may depend on the scheme and needs to be specified. Typically, in the 2-prover setting, we only allow strategies com P Q and open P Q with no communication at all between the two provers, but we may also be more liberal and allow some well-controlled communication, as in the Lunghi et al. multi-round scheme. Furthermore, in this work, we focus on classical attacks, where com P , com Q , open P and open Q are classical interactive algorithms as specified in the previous section, with access to joint randomness. But one could also consider quantum attacks, in which the provers can perform measurements on an entangled quantum state. Our main result holds for classical attacks only, and so the unfamiliar reader can safely ignore the possibility of quantum attacks, but some of our insights also apply to quantum attacks.
A somewhat accepted definition for the binding property of a 2-prover bit commitment scheme, as it is for instance used in [CSST11,LKB + 15,FF15] (up to the factor 2 in the error parameter), is as follows. Here, we assume it has been specified which attacks are allowed, e.g., those where P and Q do not communicate during the course of the scheme. Definition 2.7. A 2-prover bit commitment scheme is ε-binding in the sense of p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + 2ε if for every allowed commit strategy com P Q , and for every pair of allowed opening strategies open 
In the literature (see e.g. [CSST11] or [LKB + 15]), the two probabilities p(b 0 = 0) and p(b 1 = 1) above are usually referred to as p 0 and p 1 , respectively.
The CHSH n Scheme
Our main example is the bit commitment scheme by Crépeau et al. [CSST11] we mentioned in the introduction, and which works as follows. The commit phase com P QV instructs V to sample and send to P a uniformly random a ∈ {0, 1} n , and it instructs P to return x := r + a · b to V , where r is the joint randomness, uniformly distributed in {0, 1} n , and b is the bit to commit to, and the opening phase open P QV instructs Q to send y := r to V , and V outputs the (smaller) bit b that satisfies x + y = a · b, and b := ⊥ in case no such bit exists. Note that the provers in this scheme use the same randomness in the commit and opening phase; thus, formally, Q needs to output the shared randomness r ← ξ P Q as state Q . The opening phase uses no fresh randomness.
It is easy to see that this scheme is 2 −n -complete and perfectly hiding (completeness fails in case a = 0). For classical provers that do not communicate at all, the scheme is 2 −n−1 -binding in the sense of p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + 2 −n , i.e. according to Definition 2.7. As for quantum provers, Crépeau et al. showed that the scheme is 2 −n/2 -binding; this was recently minorly improved to 2 −(n+1)/2 by Sikora, Chailloux and Kerenidis [SCK14].
We also want to consider an extended version of the scheme, where the bit b is replaced by a string s ∈ {0, 1} n in the obvious way (where the multiplication a · s is then understood in a suitable finite field), and we want to appreciate this extension as a 2-prover string commitment scheme. However, it is a priori not clear what is a suitable definition for the binding property, especially because for this particular scheme, the dishonest provers can always honestly commit to a string s, and can then decide to correctly open the commitment to s by announcing y := r, or open to a random string by announcing a randomly chosen y -any y satisfies x + y = a · s for some s (unless a = 0, which almost never happens).
3
Due to its close relation to the CHSH game [CHSH69] , in particular to the arbitrary-finite-field version considered in [BS15] , we will refer to this string commitment scheme as CHSH n .
On the Binding Property of 2-Prover Commitment Schemes
We introduce new definitions for the binding property of 2-prover commitment schemes. In the case of bit commitment schemes, they imply Definition 2.7, as we will show. Although not necessarily simpler, we feel that our definitions are closer to the intuition of what is expected from a commitment scheme, and as such easier to work with. Indeed, the proofs of our composition results are heavily based on our new definitions. Also, our new notions are more flexible in terms of tweaking it; for instance, we modify them to obtain a relaxed notion for the binding property, which captures the binding property that is satisfied by the string commitment scheme CHSH n . Throughout this section, when quantifying over attacks against (the binding property of) a scheme, it is always understood that there is a notion of allowed attacks for that scheme (e.g., all attacks for which P and Q do not communicate), and that the quantification is over all such allowed attacks. Also, even though our focus is on classical attacks, Proposition 3.10 and Theorem 3.11 also apply to quantum attacks.
Defining The Binding Property
Intuitively, we say that a scheme is binding if after the commit phase there exists a stringŝ so that no matter what the provers do in the opening phase, the verifier will output either s =ŝ or s = ⊥ (except with small probability). We consider two definitions of the binding property which interpret this intuitive requirement in two different ways. In the first definition, which we introduce in this section,ŝ is a function of the provers' (combined) view immediately after the commit phase. In the second one, which we introduce in Section 3.2,ŝ is specified by its distribution only. Both of these definitions admit a composition theorem.
Definition 3.1 (Binding property). A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-binding if for every commit strategy com P Q [ξ P Q ] there exists a functionŝ(ξ P Q , c) of the joint randomnessξ P Q and the commitment 4 c such that for every opening strategy open P Q it holds that p(s =ŝ(ξ P Q , c) ∧ s = ⊥) ≤ ε. In short:
The string commitment scheme CHSH n does not satisfy this definition (the bit commitment version does, as we will show): After the commit phase, the provers can still decide to open the commitment to a fixed string, chosen before the commit phase, or to a random string that is out of their control. We capture this by the following relaxed version of the binding property: We allow V 's output s to be different fromŝ and ⊥, but in this case the provers should have little control over s: For any fixed target string s • , it should be unlikely that s = s • . Formally, this is captured as follows; we will show in Section 3.4 that CHSH n is fairly-binding in this sense.
Definition 3.2 (Fairly binding property).
A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-fairly-binding if for every commit strategy com P Q [ξ P Q ] there exists a functionŝ(ξ P Q , c) such that for every opening strategy
Remark 3.3. By means of standard techniques, one can easily show that it is sufficient for the (fairly) binding property to consider deterministic provers. In this case,ŝ is a function of c only, and, in the case of fairly-binding, s • runs over all fixed strings.
Remark 3.4. Clearly, the binding property implies the fairly binding property. Furthermore, in the case of bit commitment schemes it obviously holds that p(
, and thus the fairly-binding property implies the binding property with a factor-2 loss in the parameter. Furthermore, every fairly-binding string commitment scheme gives rise to a binding bit commitment scheme in a natural way, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Let S be a ε-fairly-binding string commitment scheme. Fix any two distinct strings s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} n and consider the bit-commitment scheme S obtained as follows. To commit to b ∈ {0, 1}, the provers commit to s b using S, and in the opening phase V checks if s = s b for some bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs this bit if it exists and else outputs b = ⊥. Then, S is a 2ε-binding bit commitment scheme.
Proof. Fix some commit strategy com P Q for S and note that it can also be used to attack S. Thus, there exists a functionŝ(ξ P Q , c) as in Definition 3.2. We definê
Now fix an opening strategy open P Q for S , which again is also a strategy against S. Thus, we have p(ŝ = s = s • ) ≤ ε for any s • (and in particular s • = s 0 or s 1 ). This gives us
and thus S is a 2ε-binding bit-commitment scheme.
Remark 3.6. The proof of Proposition 3.5 generalizes in a straightforward way to k-bit string commitment schemes: Given a ε-fairly-binding n-bit string commitment scheme S, for k < n, we define a k-bit string commitment scheme S k as follows: To commit to a k-bit string, the provers pad the string with n − k zeros and then commit to the padded string using S. In the opening phase, the verifier outputs the first k bits of s if the remaining bits in s are all zeros, and ⊥ otherwise. Then, S is 2 k ε-binding.
The Weak Binding Property
Here, we introduce yet another definition for the binding property. It is similar in spirit to Definition 3.1, but weaker. One advantage of this weaker notion is that it is also meaningful when considering quantum attacks, whereas Definition 3.1 is not. In the subsequent section, we will see that for bit commitment schemes, this weaker notion of the binding property is equivalent to Definition 2.7.
Definition 3.7 (Weak binding property). A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-weak-binding if for all commit strategies com P Q there exists a distribution p(ŝ) such that for every opening strategy open P Q (which then fixes the distribution p(s) of V 's output s) there is a consistent joint distribution p(ŝ, s) such that p(s =ŝ ∧ s = ⊥) ≤ ε. In short:
We also consider a related, i.e., "fairly", version of this binding property, similar to Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.8 (Fairly weak binding property).
A 2-prover commitment scheme S is ε-fairly-weakbinding if for all commit strategies com P Q there exists a distribution p(ŝ) such that for every opening strategy open P Q (which then fixes the distribution p(s) of V 's output s) there is a consistent joint distribution p(ŝ, s) so that for all s • ∈ {0, 1} n it holds that p(s =ŝ ∧ s = s • ) ≤ ε. In short:
Remark 3.9. Remarks 3.3 and 3.4 also hold for the weak binding properties. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the binding and fairly-binding properties imply their weak counterparts.
Proposition 3.10. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding string commitment scheme and define S as in Proposition 3.5. Then, S is a 2ε-weak-binding bit commitment scheme.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.5 can be easily adapted: Let p(ŝ) be as required by Definition 3.8. We define p(b) by taking the marginal of p(ŝ,b) whereb = 0 ifŝ = s 0 , andb = 1 otherwise. An opening strategy open P Q for S can also be viewed as a strategy for S. As such, there is a joint distribution p(ŝ, s) as required by Definition 3.7 which we can extend to p(ŝ, s, b) by setting
As in the proof of Proposition 3.5, one can easily check that p(b = b = ⊥) ≤ 2ε holds.
Relations Between The Definitions
Here, we show that in case of bit commitment schemes, the weak binding property as introduced in Definition 3.7 above is actually equivalent to the (p 0 +p 1 )-definition. Even though our focus is on classical attacks, the proof immediately carries over to quantum attacks as well.
Theorem 3.11. A 2-prover bit-commitment scheme is ε-binding in the sense of p 0 + p 1 ≤ 1 + 2ε if and only if it is ε-weak-binding.
Proof. First, consider a scheme that is ε-binding according to Definition 2.7. Fix a commit strategy com P Q and opening strategies open 
and furthermore, there is at most one i ∈ {0, 1} such that
This proves one direction of our claim.
For the other direction, consider a scheme that is ε-binding. 
which proves the other direction.
Remark 3.12. By Remark 3.9, it follows that Definition 3.1 also implies the p 0 + p 1 -definition. In fact, Definition 3.1 is strictly stronger (and hence, also strictly stronger than the weak-binding definition). Consider the following (artificial and very non-complete) scheme: In the commit phase, V chooses a uniformly random bit and sends it to the provers, and then accepts everything or rejects everything during the opening phase, depending on that bit. Then, p 0 + p 1 = 1, yet a commitment can be opened to 1 −b (no matter howb is defined) with probability 1 2 . Since a non-complete separation example may not be fully satisfying, we note that it can be converted into a complete (but even more artificial) scheme. Fix a "good" (i.e., complete, hiding and binding with low parameters) scheme and call our example scheme above the "bad" scheme. We define a combined scheme as follows: At the start, the first prover can request either the "good" or "bad" scheme to be used. The honest prover is instructed to choose the former, guaranteeing completeness. The dishonest prover may choose the latter, so the combined scheme inherits the binding properties of the "bad" scheme: It is binding according to the (p 0 + p 1 )-definition, but not according to Definition 3.1.
Security of CHSH n
In this section, we show that CHSH n is a fairly-binding string commitment scheme.
5 To this end, we introduce yet another version of the binding property and show that CHSH n satisfies this property. Then we show that this version of the binding property implies the fairly-binding property (up to some loss in the parameter, and some mild restrictions on the scheme).
This new binding property is based on the intuition that it should not be possible to open a commitment to two different values simultaneously (except with small probability). For this, we observe that (for classical attacks), when considering a commit strategy com P Q , as well as two opening strategies open P Q and open P Q , we can run both opening strategies simultaneously on the produced commitment with two (independent) copies of open V , by applying open P Q and open P Q to two copies of the respective internal states of P and Q). This gives rise to a joint distribution p(s, s ) of the respective outputs s and s of the two copies of open V . Remark 3.14. Also for this notion of fairly-binding, it is sufficient to consider deterministic strategies, as can easily be seen.
Proposition 3.15. The string commitment scheme CHSH n is 2 −n -fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening.
Proof. By Remark 3.14, it suffices to consider deterministic attack strategies. Fix a deterministic strategy com P Q and two deterministic opening strategies open P Q and open P Q . The strategy com P Q specifies P 's output x as a function f (a) of the verifier's message a. The opening strategies are described by constants y and y . By definition of
2 n , which proves our claim. Remark 3.16. It follows directly from (1) that every bit commitment scheme that is ε-fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening (against classical attacks) is ε/2-binding in the sense of p 0 +p 1 ≤ 1+ε (and thus also according to Definitions 3.7). The converse is not true though: The schemes from Remark 3.12 again serve as counterexamples.
Theorem 3.17. Let S = (com P QV , open P QV ) be a 2-prover commitment scheme. If S is ε-fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening and open V is deterministic, then S is 2 √ ε-fairly-binding.
Proof. By Remark 3.3, it suffices to consider deterministic strategies for the provers. We fix some deterministic commit strategy com P Q and an enumeration {open
of all deterministic opening strategies. Since we assume that open V is deterministic, for any fixed opening strategy for the provers, the verifier's output s is a function of the commitment c. Thus, for each opening strategy open i P Q there is a function f i such that the verifier's output is s = f i (c). We will now define the functionŝ(c) that satisfies the properties required by Definition 3.2. Our definition depends on a parameter α > 0 which we fix later. To defineŝ, we partition the set C of all possible commitments into disjoint sets C = R ∪ s,i C s,i that satisfy the following three properties for every i and every s:
The second property implies that there are at most α −1 non-empty sets C s,i . It is easy to see that such a partitioning exists: Start with R = C and while there exist s and i with p(c ∈ R ∧ f i (c) = s) ≥ α, let C s,i = {c ∈ R | f i (c) = s} and remove the elements of C s,i from R. For any c ∈ C, we now defineŝ(c) as follows. We setŝ(c) = s for c ∈ C s,i andŝ(c) = 0 for c ∈ R. Now fix some opening strategy open i P Q and a string s • , and write s i for the verifier's output. Using C =s• as a shorthand for s =s• j C s,j , we note that ifŝ(c) = s • then c ∈ R ∪ C =s• . Thus, it follows that
where the final inequality holds because p(c ∈ R ∧ f i (c) = s • ) < α by the choice of R, because p(f j (c) = s ∧ f i (c) = s • ) ≤ ε by the assumed binding property, and because the number of non-empty C s,j s is at most 1/α. It is easy to see that the upper bound
Combining Proposition 3.15 and Theorem 3.17, we obtain the following statement for the (fairly-)binding property of the 2-prover string commitment scheme CHSH n .
Corollary 3.18. CHSH n is 2 − n 2 +1 -fairly-binding.
For the fairly-weak-binding property, we can get a slightly better parameter. Note that we do not require open V to be deterministic here. The proof of the theorem below is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.19. Every 2-prover commitment scheme S that is ε-fairly-binding in the sense of simultaneous opening (against classical attacks) is √ 2ε-fairly-weak-binding (against classical attacks).
Corollary 3.20. CHSH n is 2 − n−1 2 -fairly-weak-binding.
Remark 3.21. It is not too hard to see that Corollary 3.20 above implies an upper bound on the classical value ω of the game CHSH 2 n considered in [BS15] of ω(CHSH 2 n ) ≤ 2 − n−1 2 + 2 −n . As such, Theorem 1.3 in [BS15] implies that the above ε is asymptotically optimal for odd n, i.e., the square root loss to the binding property of the bit commitment version is unavoidable (for odd n).
As for security against quantum attacks, we point out that [BS15, RAM15] provide an upper bound on the quantum value ω * (CHSH q ) of general finite-field CHSH; however, this does not directly imply security against quantum attacks of CHSH n as a (fairly-weak-binding) string commitment scheme.
Composing Commitment Schemes
The Composition Operation
We consider two 2-prover commitment schemes S and S of a restricted form, and we compose them to a new 2-prover commitment scheme S = S S in a well-defined way; our composition theorem then shows that S is secure (against classical attacks) if S and S are. We start by specifying the restriction to S and S that we impose.
Definition 4.1. Let S and S be two 2-prover string commitment schemes. We call the pair (S, S ) eligible if the following three properties hold, or they hold with the roles of P and Q exchanged.
1. The commit phase of S is a protocol com P V = (com P , com V ) between P and V only, and the opening phase of S is a protocol open QV = (open Q , open V ) between Q and V only. In other words, com Q and open P are both trivial and do nothing. 7 Similarly, the commit phase of S is a protocol com QV between Q and V only (but both provers may be active in the opening phase).
2.
The opening phase open QV of S is of the following simple form: Q sends a bit string y ∈ {0, 1} m to V , and V computes s deterministically as s = Extr(y, c), where c is the commitment. Furthermore, we specify that the allowed attacks on S are so that P and Q do not communicate during the course of the entire scheme, and the allowed attacks on S are so that P and Q do not communicate during the course of the commit phase but there may be limited communication during the opening phase.
An example of an eligible pair of 2-prover commitments is the pair (CHSH n , X CHSH n ), where X CHSH n coincides with scheme CHSH n except that the roles of P and Q are exchanged. We now define the composition operation. Informally, committing is done by means of committing using S, and to open the commitment, Q uses open Q to locally compute the opening information y and he commits to y with respect to the scheme S , and then this commitment is opened (to y), and V computes and outputs s = Extr(y, c). Formally, this is captured as follows (see also Figure 2 ). 
where we make it explicit that com P and open Q use joint randomness, and so do com Q and open P . When considering attacks against the binding property of the composed scheme S S , we declare that the allowed deterministic attacks 9 are those of the form (com P , open P Q • ptoq P Q • com Q ), where com P is an allowed deterministic commit strategy for S, com Q and open P Q are allowed deterministic commit and opening strategies for S , and ptoq P Q is the one-way communication protocol that communicates P 's input to Q (see also Figure 3 ).
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Remark 4.4. It is immediate that S S is a commitment scheme in the sense of Definition 2.2, and that it is complete if S and S are, with the error parameters adding up. Also, the hiding property is obviously inherited from S; however, the point of the composition is to keep the hiding property alive for longer, namely up to before the last round of the opening phase -recall that, using the terminology used in context of relativistic commitments, these rounds of the opening phase up to before the last would then be referred to as the sustain phase. We show in Appendix D that S S is hiding up to before the last round, with the error parameters adding up.
It is intuitively clear that S S should be binding if S and S are: Committing to the opening information y and then opening the commitment allows the provers to delay the announcement of y (which is the whole point of the exercise), but it does not allow them to change y, by the binding property of S ; thus, S S should be (almost) as binding as S. This intuition is confirmed by our composition theorem below. Remark 4.5. We point out that the composition S S can be naturally defined for a larger class of pairs of schemes (e.g. where both provers are active in the commit phase of both schemes), and the above intuition still holds. However, our proof only works for this restricted class of (pairs of) schemes. Extending the composition result in that direction is an open problem.
Remark 4.6. We observe that if (S, X S) is an eligible pair, where X S coincides with S except that the roles of P and Q are exchanged, then so is (X S, S X S). As such, we can then compose X S with S X S, and obtain yet another eligible pair (S, X S S X S), etc. We write S for the m-fold composition of S with itself, i.e., S = S X S S . . . for m terms. Applying this to the schemes S = CHSH n , we obtain the multi-round scheme from Lunghi et al. [LKB + 15]. As such, our composition theorem below implies security of their scheme -with a linear blow-up of the error term (instead of double exponential).
We point out that formally we obtain security of the Lunghi et al. scheme as a 2-prover commitment scheme under an abstract restriction on the provers' communication: In every round, the active prover cannot access the message that the other prover received in the previous round. As such, when the rounds of the protocol are executed fast enough so that it is ensured that there is no time for the provers to communicate between subsequent rounds, then security as a relativistic commitment scheme follows immediately.
Before stating and proving the composition theorem, we need to single out one more relevant parameter.
Definition 4.7. Let (S, S ) be an eligible pair, which in particular means that V 's action in the opening phase of S is determined by a function Extr. We define k(S) := max c,s |{y | Extr(y, c) = s}|.
I.e., k(S) counts the number of y's that are consistent with a given string s (in the worst case). Note that k(CHSH n ) = 1: For every a, x, s ∈ {0, 1} n there is at most one y ∈ {0, 1} n such that x + y = a · s.
The Composition Theorems
In the following composition theorems, we take it as understood that the assumed respective binding properties of S and S hold with respect to a well-defined respective classes of allowed attacks. We start with the composition theorem for the fairly-binding property, which is easier to prove than the one for the fairly-weak-binding property.
Theorem 4.8. Let (S, S ) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes, and assume that S and S are respectively ε-fairly-binding and δ-fairly-binding. Then, their composition S = S S is (ε + k(S) · δ)-fairly-binding.
Proof. We first consider the case k(S) = 1. We fix an attack (com P , open P Q ) against S . Without loss of generality, the attack is deterministic, so open P Q is of the form open
Note that com P is also a commit strategy for S. As such, by the fairly-binding property of S, there exists a functionŝ(c), only depending on com P , so that the property specified in Definition 3.2 is satisfied for every opening strategy open Q for S. We will show that it is also satisfied for the (arbitrary) opening strategy open P Q for S , except for a small increase in ε: We will show that p(ŝ(c) = s ∧ s = s • ) ≤ ε + δ for every fixed target string s • . This then proves the claim.
To show this property onŝ(c), we "decompose and reassemble" the attack strategy (com P , open P Q • ptoq P Q • com Q ) for S into an attack strategy (com Q , newopen P Q ) for S with newopen P Q formally defined as
where
Informally, this means that ahead of time, P and Q simulate an execution of (com P (∅)||com V (∅)) and take the resulting communication/commitment 11 c as shared randomness, and then newopen P Q computes state P from c as does com P , and runs open P Q (see Figure 3) .
12 It follows from the fairly-binding property that there is a functionŷ(c ) of the commitment c so that p(ŷ(c ) = y ∧ y = y • (c)) ≤ δ for every function y • (c). The existence ofŷ now gives rise to an opening strategy open Q for S; namely, simulate the commit phase of S to obtain the commitment c , and outputŷ(c ). By Definition 3.2, fors := Extr(ŷ(c ), c) and
We are now ready to put things together. Fix an arbitrary target string s • . For any c we let y • (c) be the unique string such that Extr(y • (c), c) = s • (and some default string if no such string exists); recall, we assume for the moment that k(S) = 1. Omitting the arguments inŝ(c),ŷ(c ) and y • (c), it follows that
Thus,ŝ is as required.
For the general case where k(S) > 1, we can reason similarly, except that we then list the k ≤ k(S) possibilities y Remark 4.9. Putting things together, we can now conclude the security (i.e., the binding property) of the Lunghi et al. multi-round commitment scheme. Corollary 3.18 ensures the fairly-binding property of CHSH n , i.e., the Crépeau et al. scheme as a string commitment scheme, with parameter 2 −n/2+1 . The composition theorem (Theorem 4.8) then guarantees the fairly-binding property of the m-fold composition as a string commitment scheme, with parameter (m + 1) · 2 −n/2+1 . Finally, Proposition 3.5 implies that the m-fold composition of CHSH n with itself is a ε m -binding bit commitment scheme with error parameter ε m = (m + 1) · 2 −n/2+2 as claimed in the introduction, or, more generally, and by taking Remark 3.6 into account, a (m + 1) · 2 −n/2+k+1 -binding k-bit-string commitment scheme.
For completeness, we also show the composition theorem for the weak version of the binding property. Since this notion makes sense also against quantum attacks, we emphasize the restriction to classical attacks -extending the theorem to quantum attacks is an open problem.
Theorem 4.10. Let (S, S ) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes, and assume that S and S are respectively ε-fairly-weak-binding and δ-fairly-weak-binding against classical attacks. Then, their composition S = S S is a (ε + k(S) · δ)-fairly-weak-binding 2-prover commitment scheme against classical attacks.
Proof. We first consider the case k(S) = 1. We fix an arbitrary deterministic attack
Then, c is a function c(a) of a, and the distribution p(a, y) is well defined. Since com P is also an attack strategy against S, there exists a distribution p(ŝ) (only depending on com P ) such that Definition 3.8 is satisfied for every opening strategy open Q for S.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.8, we reassemble the attack strategy (com P , open P Q •ptoq P Q •com Q ) for S into an attack strategy (com Q , newopen P Q ) for S . Concretely, for every fixed choice of a, we obtain a deterministic opening strategy newopen P Q,a given by
and the distribution of the verifier's output y when the provers use newopen P Q,a is p(y|a). It follows from the fairly-weak-binding property of S that there exists a distribution p(ŷ), only depending on com Q , so that for every choice of a there exists a consistent joint distribution p(ŷ, y|a) so that p(ŷ = y ∧ y = y • |a) ≤ δ for every fixed target string y • . Note that here, consistency in particular means that p(ŷ|a) = p(ŷ). This joint conditional distribution p(ŷ, y|a) together with the distribution p(a) of a then naturally defines the distribution p(a,ŷ, y), which is consistent with p(a, y) considered above.
The existence of p(ŷ) now gives rise to an opening strategy open Q for S; namely, sampleŷ according to p(ŷ) and outputŷ. Note that the joint distribution of a andŷ in this "experiment" is given by
i.e., is consistent with the distribution p(a,ŷ, y) above. By Definition 3.8, we know there exists a joint distribution p(ŝ,s), consistent with p(ŝ) fixed above and with p(s) determined bys := Extr(ŷ, c(a)), and such that p(ŝ =s ∧s = s • ) ≤ ε for every s • . We can now "glue together" p(ŝ,s) and p(c,ŷ, y,s), i.e., find a joint distribution that is consistent with both, by setting p(a,ŷ, y,s,ŝ) := p(a,ŷ, y,s) · p(ŝ|s) .
We now fix an arbitrary target string s • . Furthermore, for any a we let y • (a) be the unique string such that Extr(y • (a), c(a)) = s • (and to some default string if no such string exists); recall, we assume for the moment that k(S) = 1. With respect to the above joint distribution, it then holds that
Thus, the distribution p(ŝ, s) is as required.
For the case where k(S) > 1, we can reason similarly, except that we then list the k ≤ k(S) possibilities y 1
which then results in the claimed bound.
Remark 4.11. Analogously to Remark 4.9, we can conclude from Corollary 3.20 and Theorem 4.10 that CHSH n is (m + 1) · 2 −(n−1)/2 -fairly-weak-binding. It follows from Proposition 3.10 that CHSH n is a (m + 1) · 2 −(n+1)/2 -weak-binding bit-commitment scheme. More generally, we can conclude that for any k < n, it is a (m + 1) · 2 −(n−1)/2+k -weak-binding k-bit string commitment scheme. Below, we show how to avoid the factor 2 introduced by invoking Proposition 3.10.
Variations
In this section, we show two variants of the composition theorems. The first one says that if we compose a weak-binding with a fairly-weak-binding scheme, we obtain a weak-binding scheme. This allows us to slightly improve the parameter in Remark 4.11. The proof crucially relies on the fact that, in the weak definition, there is some freedom in "gluing together" the distributions p(s) and p(ŝ). The second variant says that composing two binding (or weak-binding) schemes yields a binding (or weak-binding, respectively) scheme.
We start by proving the following two properties for fairly-weak-binding commitment schemes. The first property shows that one may assume the joint distribution p(ŝ, s) to be such that s andŝ are independent conditioned on s =ŝ.
Lemma 4.12. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding commitment scheme. Then, for any com P Q and open P Q there exists a joint distribution p(ŝ, s) as required by Definition 3.8, but with the additional property that p(ŝ, s|s =ŝ) = p(ŝ|s =ŝ) · p(s|s =ŝ) .
Proof. Since the scheme is ε-fairly-weak-binding, it follows that there exists a consistent joint distribution p(ŝ, s) such that p(s =ŝ ∧ s = s • ) ≤ ε for every s • . Because of this, we have
We apply Lemma 2.1 to the marginal distributions p(ŝ) and p(s). The resulting joint distributionp(ŝ, s)
The second property shows that the quantification over all fixed s • in Definition 3.8 of the fairly-weakbinding property can be relaxed to s • that may depend onŝ, but only onŝ. Note that we can obviously not allow s • to depend (arbitrarily) on s, since then one could choose s • = s. Proposition 4.13. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding commitment scheme. Then
where it is understood that p(ŝ, s, s • ) := p(ŝ, s) · p(s • |ŝ). Thus, the joint distribution p(ŝ, s) is such that p(s =ŝ ∧ s = s • ) ≤ ε holds in particular for any function s • = f (ŝ) ofŝ.
Proof. For given com P Q and open P Q , let p(ŝ, s) be as guaranteed by the fairly-weak-binding property. By Lemma 4.12, we may assume without loss of generality that p(ŝ, s|s =ŝ) = p(ŝ|s =ŝ) p(s|s =ŝ). Then, by Lemma B.1, we also have that p(s, s • |s =ŝ) = p(s|s =ŝ) p(s • |s =ŝ). It follows that
where the inequality follows from the fact that p(s =ŝ ∧ s = s * • ) ≤ ε for every fixed s *
• .
For the rest of the section, we take it as understood that we only consider classical attacks.
Theorem 4.14. Let (S, S ) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes, where S is ε-weakbinding and S is δ-fairly-weak-binding, and let {0, 1} m be the domain of S. Then, the composition S S is a (ε + (2 m −1) · k(S) · δ)-weak-binding commitment scheme. In particular, if S is a bit commitment scheme then S S is a (ε + k(S) · δ)-weak-binding.
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 4.10, up to when it comes to choosing y • . Let us first consider the case m = 1, i.e., S is a bit commitment scheme. In that case, and assuming for the moment that k(S) = 1, we let y • be the unique string that satisfies Extr(y • , c) = s • , but where now s • := 1 −s. We emphasize that for a fixed c, this choice of y • is not fixed anymore (in contrast to the choice in the proof of Theorem 4.10); namely, it is a function ofs = Extr(ŷ, c), which in turn is a function ofŷ. Therefore, by Proposition 4.13, it still holds that p(y =ŷ ∧ y = y • |a) ≤ δ, and we can conclude that
In the case that k(S) > 1, we instead randomly select one of the at most k(S) strings y • that satisfy Extr(y • , c) = s • = 1 −s. Then, conditioned on a, y • is still independent of y givenŷ, so that Proposition 4.13 still applies, and we can argue as above, except that we get a factor k(S) blow-up from
Finally, for the case m > 1, we first pick a random s • ∈ {0, 1} m \ {s}, and then choose y • such that Extr(y • , c) = s • , uniquely or at random, depending of k(S). Conditioned on a, y • is still independent of y givenŷ, and therefore Proposition 4.13 still applies, but now we get an additional factor (2
Remark 4.15. Theorem 4.14 allows us to slightly improve the bound we obtain in Remark 4.11 on the Lunghi et al. multi-round commitment scheme. By Theorem 4.10, we can compose m instances of CHSH n to obtain a m · 2 −(n−1)/2 -fairly-weak-binding string commitment scheme. Then, we can compose the Crépeau et al. bit commitment scheme (i.e., the bit commitment version of CHSH n ), which is 2 −(n−1) -weak-binding, with this fairly-weak-binding string commitment scheme; by Theorem 4.14, this composition, which is the Lunghi et al. multi-round bit commitment scheme, is m · 2 −(n−1)/2 + 2 −(n−1) -weak-binding.
Finally, for completeness, we point out that the composition theorem also applies to two ordinary binding or weak-binding commitment schemes.
Theorem 4.16. Let (S, S ) be an eligible pair of 2-prover commitment schemes, where S is ε-binding and S is δ-binding. Then, the composition S S is (ε + δ)-binding. The same holds for the weak-binding property.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as in Theorem 4.8 or Theorem 4.10, respectively, except that now there are no s • and y • , and in the end we can simply conclude that
where the second inequality holds since y = ⊥ implies that s = Extr(y, c) = ⊥.
Tightness
We now show that our composition result is nearly tight for CHSH n . Let CHSH n m be the m-fold composition of CHSH n with itself, as defined in Remark 4.6. We show that for even n, this composed scheme can be ε-weak-binding as a bit-commitment scheme only if ε −n/2 (for even n).
Lemma 4.17. Consider functions X n , Y n :
where a, s and r are selected uniformly at random in R n . It holds that:
1. There are X n and Y n such that p(X n (a, r) + Y n (s, r) = a · s) = q n for all a, s ∈ F 2 n . 2. For even n, we have q n = Ω 2 −n/2 . For odd n, we have q n = Ω 2 −2n/3 .
Proof. Fix X n and Y n that achieve the maximum in Equation (7). We show that there also are functions X n and Y n such that for any a and s, p(X n (a, r) + Y n (s, r) = a · s) = q n : Without loss of generality, X n and Y n depend only on a and s, not on r. Intuitively, X n and Y n do the following: They randomize their inputs a and s by adding uniformly random elements r a , r s ∈ F 2 n , then apply X n and Y n , and finally remove the random terms again from the output. Formally, we let
For r a and r s uniformly random, we have p(X n (a + r a ) + Y n (s + r s ) = as + ar s + r a r s + sr a ) = q n . Thus, it is easy to see that p(X n (a, (r a , r s )) + Y n (s, (r a , r s )) = as) = q n . The functions X n and Y n in Equation (7) describe strategies for the CHSH n game with classical players and q n is the maximal winning probability that classical players can achieve in this game. As shown in [BS15] , it holds that q n = Ω 2 −n/2 for even n, and q n = Ω 2 −2n/3 for odd n.
The following lemma can be seen as a generalization of Theorem 3.11 to string commitment schemes. Intuitively, it bounds the winning probability of the provers in the following game: First, they have to produce a commitment. Then, they receive a uniformly random string s • and, in order to win, they have to open the commitment to s • . The winning probability in this game is at most ε+2 −n , when the scheme is an ε-fairly-weak-binding n-bit string commitment scheme.
Lemma 4.18. Let S be a ε-fairly-weak-binding n-bit string commitment scheme. Fix an allowed commit strategy com P Q for S and, for each s • ∈ F 2 n , an allowed opening strategy open P Q (s • ). Let p(s|s • ) be the output distribution of S if the provers use com P Q and open P Q (s • ). Let p(s • ) be distributed uniformly over
Proof. Let p(ŝ) be a distribution that satisfies Equation (6) for the commit strategy com P Q . Now consider any consistent joint distribution p(s,ŝ|s • ). Here, consistency also means that p(ŝ|s • ) = p(ŝ). Thus, for a uniformly random s • , p(ŝ = s • ) = 2 −n . By the ε-fairly-weak-binding property of S, we have
and thus our claim follows.
13 The paper states ε 1 3 m2 −n/2 , but their binding definition is p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε; to convert their bound to our definition (equivalent to p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + 2ε), it must be multiplied by 1/2.
With the help of the lemma above, is easy to see that q n limits the binding parameter of the oneround scheme CHSH n : If P sends X n (a, r) and Q sends Y n (s • , r) for uniformly random r, then we have p(s = s • |a = 0) = q n , and thus p(s = s • ) ≥ q n − 2 −n for every s • . Thus, by Lemma 4.18, CHSH n can be ε-fairly-weak-binding only if ε ≥ q n − 2 −n+1 . We now show that this bound scales approximately linearly with the number of rounds. , it holds that ε ≥ Ω(mq n ). If, furthermore, n is even, we have ε ≥ Ω m2 −n/2 ; if n is odd, ε ≥ Ω m2 −2n/3 .
Proof. Let X n (a, r) and Y n (b, r) be functions as in Lemma 4.17. We define a commit strategy com P Q and an opening strategy open P Q (s • ) for every s • which aims to open to s • . We assume that the provers have m uniformly random strings r i ∈ F 2 n and (m + 1)/2 uniformly random inputs r i , i odd, for X n and Y n as shared randomness. We write c i = (a i , x i ) for the communication between the verifier and the active prover in round i, where the x i are specified below. The dishonest provers exchange their communications as fast as possible, so in round i + 2, the active prover knows c 1 , . . . , c i . Let y 0 = s • and for i > 0, let y i such that Extr(y i , c i ) = y i−1 . Such a y i exists and is unique if a i = 0. We only specify our strategy for the case where the verifier's messages a i are all non-zero and assume that the provers fail to open to s • otherwise. One can compute y i from c 1 , . . . , c i , so in round i + 2, the active prover can compute y i .
If in any round i, the commitment is (a i , r i + a i · y i−1 ), the provers can open to s • simply by following the honest strategy for CHSH n m from that round on. The strategy described below is such that the provers have (m + 1)/2 chances to bring about this situation with probability q n .
-Round 1 (commit): P produces a "fake commitment" x 1 = X n (a 1 , r 1 ).
-Round i, i even: Q computes y i−1 = Y n (y i−2 , r i−1 ), hoping that x i−1 + y i−1 = a i−1 · y i−2 , i.e., y i−1 = y i−1 . He honestly commits to y i−1 by computing x i = a i · y i−1 + r i . -Round i+1, i even: P checks if y i−1 = y i−1 . If yes, both provers proceed honestly from this round on, i.e., they follow the honest strategy for CHSH n m in all subsequent rounds. 14 If not, P again produces a "fake commitment" x i+1 = X n (a i+1 , r i+1 ).
By definition, we have y i−1 = y i−1 if and only if X n (a i−1 , r i−1 ) + Y n (y i−2 , r i−1 ) = a i−1 · y i−2 , which happens with probability q n . In this case, we have c i = (a i , r i + a i · y i−1 ), so the provers can indeed open to s • by proceeding honestly (ignoring completeness errors for now).
By definition of X n , Y n , and q n , if the provers use the strategy open P Q (s • ), then for
−n for all s • . Applying Lemma 4.18, we conclude that the scheme can be ε-fairly-weak-binding only if
which is in Ω(mq n ) if m = o q −1 n . Finally, we have Ω(mq n ) = Ω m2 −n/2 if n is even and Ω(mq n ) = Ω m2 −2n/3 if n is odd, by claim 2 of Lemma 4.17.
From the analysis in the above proof, we can also derive a version of the theorem for the bitcommitment scheme described in Proposition 3.10.
B A Property for Conditionally Independent Random Variables
Let p(x, y, z) be a distribution, and let Λ ⊂ X × Y × Z be an event. Then, we write x → y → z to express that p(x, z|y) = p(x|y) p(z|y), and x → Λ → y to express that p(x, y|Λ) = p(x|Λ) p(y|Λ), etc.
Lemma B.1. If x → y → z and x → x = y → y, then x → x = y → z.
Proof. We assume that x → y → z and x → x = y → y. We first observe that p(x, x = y, z|y) = p(x, x = y|y) p(z|x, y, x = y) = p(x, x = y|y) p(z|x, y) = p(x, x = y|y) p(z|y) , which means that (x, x = y) → y → z, and, by summing over x, implies x = y → y → z. It follows that p(z|x, y, x = y) = p(z|y) = p(z|y, x = y) , which actually means that x → (y, x = y) → z. Therefore, = p(x|x = y) p(z|x = y) , which was to be proven.
C Proof of Theorem 3.19
Fix a commit strategy com P Q against S. Enumerate all strings in the domain {0, 1}
n of S as s 1 , . . . , s 2 n , and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
n } let open i P Q be an opening strategy maximizing p i := p(s = s i ), where s is the output of the verifier when P and Q use this strategy. We assume without loss of generality that the p i s are in descending order. We define p(ŝ) as follows. Let N ≥ 2 be an integer which we will fix later. By Definition 3.13 and inequality (2), it holds that
where we let p i = 0 for i > 2 n in case N > 2 n . We would like to define p(ŝ) as p(ŝ = s i ) := p i −(N −1)ε/2 for all i ≤ N, 2 n ; however, this is not always possible because p i − (N − 1)ε/2 may be negative. To deal with this, let N be the largest integer such that N ≤ N and p 1 , . . . , p N ≥ (N − 1)ε/2. (We take N = 0 if p 1 < (N − 1)ε/2.) It follows that 
and thus, we have shown for all s • ∈ {0, 1} n that
We now select N so that this value is minimized: It is easy to verify that the function f : R >0 → R >0 , x → 1/x + (x − 1)ε/2 has its global minimum in 2/ε; thus, we pick N := 2/ε , which gives us
for any s • ∈ {0, 1} n , as claimed.
D The Hiding Property of Composed Schemes
We already mentioned that the standard hiding property is not good enough for multi-round bit commitment schemes: The standard definition is not violated if the verifier learns the string s immediately after the commit phase. However, the purpose of multi-round schemes is to maintain the commitment over a longer period of time in the relativistic setting, without disclosing the string s until the very end. In this appendix, we define a hiding property that captures this requirement, and we prove that a composed scheme S = S S is hiding if both S and S are hiding (with the error parameters adding up).
Definition D.1. Let S = (com P QV , open P QV ) be a commitment scheme. We write v for the verifier's view immediately before the last round of communication in open P QV . We say that a scheme is ε-hiding until the last round if for any (possibly dishonest) verifier V and any two inputs s 0 and s 1 to the honest provers, we have d(p(v|s 0 ), p(v|s 1 )) ≤ ε.
Theorem D.2. Let S be a ε-hiding commitment scheme and S a scheme that is δ-hiding until the last round. If (S, S ) is eligible, then the composed scheme S = S S is (ε + δ)-hiding until the last round.
Proof. Fix a strategy against the hiding-until-the-last-round property of S . We consider the distribution p(v, y, v |s) where s is the string that the provers commit to, v the verifier's view after com P QV has been executed, y the opening information to which Q commits using the scheme S , and v the verifier's view immediately before the last round of communication. We need to show that d(p(v |s 0 ), p(v |s 1 )) ≤ ε + δ for any s 0 and s 1 . First, note that p(v |v, y, s b ) = p(v |v, y) since v is produced by P , Q and V acting on y and v only. From any strategy against S , we can obtain a strategy against S by fixing v. Thus, by the hiding property of S , for any y 0 and y 1 , we have d(p(v |v, y = y 0 ), p(v |v, y = y 1 )) ≤ δ and it follows by the convexity of the statistical distance in both arguments that where the first and last equality hold because v contains v since v is the view of V at a later point in time.
